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Sovereign Immunity Abrogated in Ohio:
Krause v. State1, 2
James B. Wilkens*
THE DOCTRINE OF SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY has been pronounced dead
in Ohio. That report may prove to have been exaggerated. At the
very least, the anatomy of that which has passed and that which
remains is beclouded in uncertainty.
The Court of Appeals of Ohio for Cuyahoga County, sitting in.
Cleveland, had before it an appeal by plaintiff from judgment for
defendant following the granting of a motion to quash service of
process on the State of Ohio. The action was for the recovery of dam-
ages from the state for the wrongful death of plaintiff's decedent,
alleged to have been caused by the activity of the Ohio National
Guard on the campus of Kent State University in May of 1970. Judg-
ment was reversed and the cause remanded for further proceedings.
The court-written syllabus, which does not have the controlling
force peculiarly attributed to the syllabi of the Ohio Supreme Court,3
summarizes the decision in the following words:
1. The State of Ohio is responsible under the doctrine of
respondeat superior for the tortious acts of its authorized agents.
A complaint alleging the tortious conduct of an agent while en-
gaged in authorized activity on behalf of the state states a cause
of action.
2. The doctrine of sovereign immunity cannot be supported
in Ohio in the light of the history of Section 16, Article I of the
Ohio Constitution, as amended in the Convention of 1912, and
the legislative policy reflected in the general procedural statutes
governing suability in Ohio. Moreover, a special shield for the
state against responsibility for its tortious acts is unjust, ar-
bitrary, and unreasonable and results in discrimination prohibited
by the equal protection and due process clauses of the Four-
teenth Amendment to the United States Constitution.
3. If the doctrine of sovereign immunity had any vitality in
Ohio after the amendment of Section 16, Article I, in the Conven-
tion of 1912, it was derived from judicial interpretation. As a
creation of the courts, the doctrine can be removed by the
judiciary.
4. The possibility that the removal of sovereign immunity
may impede or inhibit agents of the state in the proper perform-
ance of necessary, authorized functions on behalf of the state can
be obviated by the retention of immunity from civil liability
*B.A., Lawrence College; Ph.D., Cornell University; Fourth-year student at Cleveland
State University College of Law.
I Krause v. State, 28 Ohio App. 2d 1,-N.E. 2d- (1971).
2 This comment will be restricted to tort actions, although some interesting and dif-
ferent results are obtained in contract actions and in actions relating to state taking
of private property.
3 Parkview Hospital v. Hospital Service Ass'n., 8 Ohio App. 2d 315, 222 N.E. 2d 314
(1966).
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for individual agents of the state when performing in an author-
ized capacity on the state's behalf while at the same time im-
posing liability on the state when the activity is tortious.
4
The decision thus promulgates three principal rulings: (1) that
sovereign immunity does not provide a bar to bringing an action
against the State of Ohio, (2) that the state is liable by virtue of the
doctrine of respondeat superior for the authorized activities of its
officers, employees and other agents, and (3) that freedom of indivi-
dual agents from civil liability arising out of authorized activities
for the state is retained. The effects of these rulings are far from
obvious, in large part because of the confused prior state of the law
upon which they are engrafted. Furthermore, the grounds given for
abrogation of the state's immunity to suit can be subjected to severe
criticism.
The issue of sovereign immunity provides the advocate with a
fertile field from which he can harvest judicial pronouncements sup-
porting a vast range of assertions as to its meaning and effect, and
not infrequently opposing advocates can select contradictory state-
ments from the same opinion.5 The adjudicator's task is not so easily
rewarded. He must attempt either to fashion out of, or to lay over,
this quagmire of confusion a decision not itself muddy with uncer-
tainty.I The root of the dificulty is that the doctrine of sovereign immunity
has been variously held to be: (1) a procedural bar to bringing an
action against the state (or its subsidiary agencies and subdivisions)
unless properly consented to, i.e. a lack of general jurisdiction of the
courts to hear an action or enforce service of process against the state
or its subsidiaries;6 (2) a substantive rule of law providing that the
state and its subsidiaries are not liable for damages which are either
the inevitable or the accidental result of state-authorized activities;7
and (3) both a procedural bar to action against the state and a sub-
stantive rule of non-liability of the state for harm resulting from its
operations.8 Qualifications, exceptions, extensions and outright con-
tradictions abound as to all three basic statements of the doctrine.8a
4 Krause v. State, 28 Ohio App. 2d 1,-N.E. 2d-(1971).
Hack v. City of Salem, 174 Ohio St. 383, 189 N.E. 2d. 857 (1963) ; Board of Educ. v.
Volk, 72 Ohio St. 469, 74 N.E. 646 (1905); Dunn v. Agricultural Soc'y., 46 Ohio St.
93, 18 N.E. 496 (1888). See also Bailey v. City of New York, 3 Hill 531, 38 Am.
Dec. 669 (N.Y. 1842) ; Borchard, Government Liability in Tort, 34 YALE L. J. 1, 129,
229 (1924-25); Borchard, Governmental Respqonsibility in Tort, 36 YALE L.J. 1, 757.
1039 (1926-27); Lawyer, Birth and Death of Governmental Immunity, 15 CLEV.-MAR.
L. REv. 529 (1966) ; and Schultz, Comment-Ohio Sovereign Immunity: Long Lives
the King, 28 OHIo ST. L.J. 75 (1967).
6 West Park Shopping Center v. Masheter, 6 Ohio St. 2d 142, 216 N.E. 2d 761 (1966)
Wilson v, Cincinnati, 172 Ohio St. 303, 175 N.E. 2d 725 (1961) ; Raudabaugh v. State,
96 Ohio St. 513, 118 N.E. 102 (1917).
7 Wayman v. Board of Educ. 5 Ohio St. 2d 248, 215 N.E.2d 394 (1966).
8 Board of Educ. v. Volk, 72 Ohio St. 469, 74 N.E. 646 (1905). Cf. Smith v. State, 227
N.Y. 405, 125 N.E. 841 (1920).
8a "Procedural" is used here rather loosely; jurisdiction is a substantive question.
Schaffer v. Board of Trustees of Veterans Memorial, 171 Ohio St. 228, 229, 166 N.E.2d
547, 548 (1960).
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Board of Education v. Volk, 9 for example, holds that a board of
education is not liable to adjoining property owners for injuries to
their buildings resulting from excavation on school land despite valid
statutory consent to sue boards of education and statutory liability
of land owners causing such injuries. The court held that the board
was created and authorized to hold property and to expend public
funds only for the advancement of education; that the commission
of torts, even if incidental to that purpose, was not within the scope
of its authority; and hence that no liability could be found. But the
same opinion quoted, with obvious approval, a statement of the pro-
lific Judge Cooley that, while liability attaches to the state for its
wrongs, no remedy is provided unless there is a valid consent to suit
and the opinion also suggested that the board might have been en-
joinable upon timely petition. The ultra vires argument is rather out
of fashion, but the result and the confusion of rationalization are
not. Nonetheless, and aside from questions of terminology, it seems
clear that both the procedural jurisdiction issue and the substantive
liability issue are recognized by Ohio courts.10
The abolition of the doctrine of sovereign immunity asserted in
paragraphs 2 and 3 of the court's syllabus, while not absolutely un-
ambiguous in themselves, appear clearly to refer to the procedural
bar to actions against the state when the majority opinion is read
with them. Thus the majority gives three grounds for its decision that
the state is not immune from suit even in the absence of express and
unequivocal consent to sue or waiver of immunity, namely (1) that
such immunity violates the equal protection and due process clauses
of the fourteenth amendment to the United States Constitution; (2)
that in fact valid Ohio statutes can and should be read to give general
consent to sue the state, as authorized by the constitution of Ohio;
and (3) that, in exercise of its independent power to alter the rule of
immunity from suit, the court finds that no just and rational public
interest is served by that rule to counterbalance the unfair burden
of state-sponsored injury which operation of the rule leaves without
remedy. A fourth ground for the abolition of immunity is given a
forceful and apparently novel exposition in the majority opinion, but
reliance upon it is ultimately disclaimed. This ground is that the Ohio
constitution itself contains a general consent to sue the state, effec-
tive without any requirement of legislative implementation. With
the possible exception of the purely judicial abolition argument, each
of these four findings is in direct conflict with explicit holdings in
applicable cases by the appropriate court of last resort.
In Palmer v. Ohio11 the United States Supreme Court held that the
right of an individual to sue a state in either a state or a federal court
72 Ohio St. 469, 74 N.E. 646 (1905).
10 Wolf v. Ohio State Univ. Hosp., 170 Ohio St. 49, 162 N.E.2d 475 (1959).
n 248 U.S. 32 (1918).
3Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 1972
21 CLEVE. ST. L. R. (1)
must arise from consent of the state, which consent is to be construed
according to state law since no federal question is involved. The Ohio
Supreme Court had found no authority to bring the action against the
State of Ohio for damage caused by overflow from its canal and had
affirmed the granting of a motion to quash service of process upon the
state. It is certainly true that in the fifty-odd years since Palmer, the
Supreme Court's handling of contentions that various state actions
are not permissible by virtue of the fourteenth amendment has sus-
tained great changes, resulting in massive expansion of the areas
where states may not rule with unbridled discrimination, 2 and that
Court may welcome an opportunity to review this particular branch
of state action which does not appear to have been directly presented
to it recently. 13 Without speculating explicitly upon the outcome of
such a review, it seems beyond argument that the state (and its sub-
sidiaries) has at least some legitimate interests unlike those of any
private corporation or individual and that at least some of those
interests would be to some extent served by a policy of limiting the
power to bring suit under at least some circumstances and with
respect to some potential parties. A reversal of the presumption of
immunity-i.e. a finding that a general rule of state immunity from
suit, with perhaps express exceptions, is not compatible with the equal
protection and due process clauses, but that limited rules of immunity
whose precise and limited purposes may be subjected to effective
judicial scrutiny do not so offend-might provide an appropriate and
flexible means of balancing state and individual interests consonant
with modem concepts of federal-state-private relationships.
The finding of the court that effective consent to suit had been
given by the statutes creating and defining the general jurisdiction of
Ohio courts14 contravenes two well-settled principles of statutory con-
struction. These are that both statutes in derogation of the common
law15 and those asserted to control and affect the actions and liabilities
of the state16 are to be strictly construed. Since the court expressly
holds the doctrine of state immunity from suit to be court-made and
since it is certainly reading those statutes to control and affect the
operations and obligations of the state, it presumably must find ex-
plicit inclusion of the parties it is removing from the protection of
the doctrine in the coverage of the jurisdictional statutes it reads to
authorize suits otherwise barred by the doctrine of immunity. But by
its own admission the majority finds only general language, merely
12 Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962).
13 See Parden v. Terminal Ry. of Ala. State Docks Dept., 377 U.S. 184, 194- (1964). But
see Corbean v. Board of Educ., 366 F.2d 480 (6th Cir. 1966), cert. denied 385 U.S.
1041 (1967).
14 E.g., OHio REv. Cone ANN. §§ 2307.01, 2305.1 (Page Supp. 1970).
15 Raudabaugh v. State, 96 Ohio St. 515, 118 N.E. 102 (1917) ; Ray v. Board of Trustees
of Trenton Twp., 49 Ohio App. 172, 195 N.E. 707 (1934).
16 State ex rel Parrott v. Board of Public Works, 36 Ohio St. 409 (1881) ; State ex rel
Williams v. Glander, 148 Ohio St. 188, 74 N.E.2d 82 (1947) ; Palumbo v. Industrial
Comm'n., 140 Ohio St. 54, 42 N.E. 2d 766 (1942).
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not exclusive of the state or its subsidiaries, in those statutes. And on
many occasions even statutes apparently giving express authorization
to sue particular subsidiaries have been so narrowly read as to defeat
that apparent authorization.1 7 Neither the majority opinion nor the
dissent mentions these principles of statutory construction.
Although a court ordinarily has the power to alter or strike down
a rule of law which exists only by court sanction, it will usually be
reluctant to do so where, as here, the rule is of long standing and
carries overtones of legislative reliance upon its existence in that
numerous statutes granting limited consent to suit have been en-
acted.la The dissent points out that in Palumbo v. Industrial Commis-
sion1 8 it was stated that even where an express statutory consent to
suit existed, the suit could not be allowed because no directions as to
what court could hear the case and upon what officer service of pro-
cess could be made were given in the statute, and the courts could
not supply those omissions because the constitution authorized only
the legislature and not the courts to make those determinations. It
is perhaps arguable that the wording of article I, section 1619 can
be read to include court-made as well as legislature-made regulation
of actions, but it is at least as arguable that the majority determina-
tion that the courts may strike down this particular rule of their own
making is in direct conflict with the controlling holding in Palumbo,
for the questions of jurisdiction and particularly of service determin-
ative there are certainly at issue on this appeal
The finding that article I, section 16 of the Ohio constitution as
amended in 1912 is itself a complete and effective manisfestation of
the state's consent to be sued is directly contradicted by Rauidabaugh
v. State20 which has been followed by numerous subsequent cases. In
Raudabaugh-Palmer it was held that the constitutional authorization
merely empowered the legislature to give such consent to sue the
state and under such regulations as it saw fit. The court there pointed
out that essentially identical language in the California and Tennessee
constitutions and very similar wording in many other state consti-
tutions had, at the time of the 1912 constitutional convention and
ratification, long been authoritatively interpreted to be not self-
executing. The court there presumed that the framers of the amend-
ment were aware of those precedents,20a implying that if they had
17 Wolf v. Ohio State Univ. Hosp., 170 Ohio St. 49, 162 N.E.2d 475 (1959); Board of
Educ. v. Volk, 72 Ohio St. 469, 74 N.E. 646 (1905).
l7aSchaffer v. Board of Trustees of Veterans Memorial, 171 Ohio St. 229, 168 N.E.2d
547 (1960).
18 14-0 Ohio St. 54, 42 N.E.2d 766 (1942).
19 "All courts shall be open, and every person, for an injury done him in his land, goods,
person, or reputation, shall have remedy by due course of law, and shall have justice
administered without denial or delay. Suits may be brought against the state, in such
courts and in such manner, as may be provided by law." (Second sentence added in
1912).
20 96 Ohio St. 513, 118 N.E. 102 (1917), decided by the Supreme Court of Ohio in the
same opinion as Palmer v. Ohio, afj'd. 248 U.S. 32 (1918).20aRaudabaugh v. State, 96 Ohio St. 513, 516, 118 N.E. 102, 103 (1917).
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proposed to effect a different result, they would have adopted other
language.
No reference to the actual content of the discussion and debate
of the constitutional convention of 1912 is apparent in decisions pre-
vious to Krause. The majority in Krause quotes at length from the
report of those proceedings to support its finding that the intent of
the delegates in proposing by an overwhelming majority2 ' the ulti-
mately adopted amendment was that it constitute in itself complete
authority to sue the state. A reading of the entire report of the debates
on that proposed amendment leaves this writer somewhat better
supplied with quotations supporting the view that self-execution was
contemplated than the view that only authorization of implementa-
tion by the legislature was intended. Thus ". . . its denial of the old-
time notion that the state or sovereign can not be amenable to the
suit of a citizen without its consent .... *"22 and "Let the humblest
citizen feel that... he is the equal of the sovereign before the law" 23 as
opposed to "The legislature ought to have a right to provide by law
for the adjustment of controversies between its citizens and the state.
That is the purpose of the proposal. '24
Whatever the delegates may have known about the provisions
and interpretation of the constitutions of other states (and there were
in fact references to some of these), 25 they left no doubt that they
were aware that it was common practice for the legislature in Ohio
to enact special consent for particular suits. 26 Thus perhaps the most
persuasive conclusion that can be drawn is that the delegates intended
to make some change in the then existing situation. But it also seems
that they were more interested in the result than in the procedure
for achieving it. Of course, appeal to "legislative" history and the
afterwards perceived intent of the delegates is only proper if the lan-
guage of the provision being interpreted is subject to more than one
reading 27 under the principle that constitutions, unlike statutes, are
to be liberally construed in favor of a citizen as against the state.28
21 By 88 to 6, 2 PROCEEDINGS AND DEBATES OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION OF THE
STATE OF OHIO 1960 (1912). There was a preliminary vote of 71 to 12, id. at 1919.
2 Id. at 1431.
23 Id.
24 Id. at 1919.
25 Id. at 1431.
26 Id. The writer has been unable in the short time between the entering of the Krause
decision and the publication deadline of this issue, to find any Ohio cases treating
state tort liability under private consent acts, but Seely v. State, 11 Ohio 501 (1842),
aff'd. on rehearing 12 Ohio 496 (1843), a contract case in which an ad hoc jurispru-
dence was adopted involving liberal violations of the parol evidence rule, suggests
that this might be a good source of unorthodox precedents.
27 State ex rel Harbage v. Ferguson, 68 Ohio App. 189, 36 N.E.2d 500 (1941), appeal
dismissed, 138 Ohio St. 617, N.E.2d 544 (1941).
28 Board of Elections v. State ex rel Schneider, 128 Ohio St. 275, 191 N.E. 115 (1934)
Hockett v. State Liquor Lic. Bd., 91 Ohio St. 176, 110 N.E. 485 (1915). See also State
ex rel Russell v. Bliss, 156 Ohio St. 147, 101 N.E.2d 289 (1951).
The official explanation, mailed with the text of the proposed amendment to every
elector, said that ". . . it will authorize individuals to bring suit against the state
. . . in such courts and in such manner as may be provided by law." A. FOOTE,
PROPOSED AMENDMENTS TO THE CONSTITUTION OF OHIO 15 (1912).
Jan. 1972
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The existence of a substantive branch of the sovereign immunity
doctrine is demonstrated by the many cases finding no cause of action
to be stated in a complaint against the state where there was consent
to sue and the allegations would have made out a good cause of action
against a private party, although certainly many of those decisions
do not label their holdings "sovereign immunity." 29 It is, of course, one
of the classic functions of tort law to balance the interest of the de-
fendant in engaging in the activity which led to the injury complained
of against the risk of harm incident to such activity, and the state and
its subsidiaries do have some interests which are different from those
of private parties. This is true even where the activities engaged
in are also sometimes engaged in by private parties. Those interests
peculiar to governmental entities most frequently alluded to as
worthy of protection are (1) the preservation of the freedom of its
officers, employees and other agents from harassment by frequent
suits and from the threat of personal liability so that they may guide
their performance of their authorized functions by pursuit of the gen-
eral public welfare rather than by avoidance of litigation 0 and (2)
the prevention of dissipation of public revenues in payment of claims
which do not advance the public purposes for which taxes were
levied, under the control of local juries which, at least with respect
to the state itself if not also its subdivisions, are sometimes supposed
to be prone to deciding that little justification is required for effecting
the return of some of that revenue to the local private economy. 31
The frustrating complexities and contradictions produced through
the case by case elucidation of the distinctions between "govern-
mental" and "proprietary" activities and between "discretionary" and
"ministerial" functions and between "mandatory" and "optional"
duties are too well documented to require rehearsal here.3 2 Ohio
courts have been reluctant to find the state or its subsidiaries liable
for injuries caused by their agents in the course of performing author-
ized functions, even where those functions are arguably ministerial,
not discretionary, and performed in connection with arguably proprie-
tary, not governmental, activities. 33 Such distinctions are, however,
25 Wolf v. Ohio State Univ. Hosp., 170 Ohio St. 4-9, 162 N.E. 2d 475 (1959) ; Board of
Educ. v. Volk, 72 Ohio St. 469, 74 N.E. 646 (1905).
30 Gregoire v. Biddle, 177 F.2d 579, 581 (2d Cir. 1949).
31 Board of Educ. v. Volk, 72 Ohio St. 469, 74 N.E. 646 (1905); 2 PROCEEDINGS AND
DEBATES OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION OF THE STATE OF OHIO 1919 (1912).
32 Hack v. Salem, 174- Ohio St. 383, 189 N.E.2d 857 (1963).
33 Wolf v. Ohio State Univ. Hosp., 170 Ohio St. 49, 162 N.E. 2d 475 (1959) ; Conrad v.
Board of Educ., 29 Ohio App. 317, 163 N.E. 567 (1928) ; Broughton v. Cleveland, 167
Ohio St. 29, 146 N.E. 2d 301 (1959); Hack v. Salem, 174 Ohio St. 393, 189 N.E. 2d
857 (1963). The situation appears to be as follows: As to torts arising out of the
conduct of governmental activities, neither the state nor a municipal corporation is
liable. Municipal corporations are held liable for torts arising out of the conduct of
proprietary activities, but very few municipal activities are found to be proprietary.
Whether the state would be liable for torts arising out of its proprietary activities
has not been determined since all tort suits where consent to sue has been found appear
to have involved governmental activities.
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employed in Ohio, as elsewhere, in adjudicating the personal liability
of officers, employees and other agents of the state and its sub-
sidiaries.34
The holding in Krause that the state is to be subject to the opera-
tion of the doctrine of respondeat superior in determining its liability
for the torts of its agents would thus appear to bring to bear this whole
body of distinctions, previously applicable to the agent personally,
upon the issue of the state's liability. And that is not unreasonable,
since those distinctions have in fact been drawn, however imperfectly,
to protect the interests of the general public, as embodied in the state
and its subsidiaries, and not to protect the personal interests of the
agents. The balancing of interests as a normal part of tort litigation is
perhaps the strongest argument, although not explicitly advanced in
the Krause opinion, in support of the court's decision to strike down
the procedural bar of sovereign immunity, since the interests of the
state should be adequately protected by the ordinary principles of
tort law without the indiscriminate suppression of the interests of the
injured party implicit in the operation of the procedural bar.
What appears at first to be a straightforward and desirable,
albeit revolutionary, extension of respondeat superior to create state
liability in some circumstances where it would not previously have
been found, is transformed into a revolution upon a revolution by
the concurrent holding that immunity from civil liability is to be
retained as to the agents. The use of the word "retention" in para-
graph 4 of the syllabus strongly implies that state liability is being
authorized by way of the respondeat superior holding for actions
which formerly would not have been found to place liability upon the
agent. This implication is explicitly confirmed in the opinion:
. . .[T] here is no reason in logic for exempting a state from
a response in damages to private persons injured by the discretion-
ary and authorized acts o If] agents of the state even though
agents may be immune. For there are logical reasons, such as en-
couraging "unflinching discharge of duty," to justify immunizing
an agent's exercise of discretion which do not logically extend to
the innoculation of the state against the consequences of well-
intentioned, authorized, but tortious and damaging acts of state
agents. The agents need to perform their authorized duties in an
uninhibited manner but the state does not need to avoid the re-
sponsibility in tort for the consequences of the agents' damaging
acts. It can well afford to respond and in justice should.35 [Empha-
sis added.]
Unless the court meant to adopt a rule of universal strict liability
for the state, it appears to have opened up a whole new area of juris-
prudence in which the scope of the liability of the state for the discre-
34 Brinkman v. Drolesbaugh, 97 Ohio St. 171, 119 N.E. 4-51 (1918) ; Reckman v. Kelter,
109 Ohio App. 81, 164 N.E.2d 448 (1959); Stine v. Atkinson, 69 Ohio App. 529, 44
N.E.2d 372 (1942).
35 Krause v. State, 28 Ohio App. 1, 8, -N.E. 2d-, - (1971).
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tionary acts of its agents will have to be determined. Many questions,
which previously would not have received serious hearing could,
under this holding, be presented. For example, would the state be
liable for the failure of the General Assembly to appropriate suffi-
cient funds to keep the state highways in safe condition or for defama-
tion by a judge in the course of proceedings in his court? 36
It was to be expected that the events at Kent State in the spring
of 1970 would produce litigation which would subject the judicial
system as well as other parts of the established order of society to pen-
etrating re-examination. Few could have anticipated the far-reaching
changes announced by this decision, which must challenge the record
for the number of controlling precedents that would have to be
abandoned to sustain it in its entirety.
The court was undoubtedly speaking for the people of Ohio in
broadening the remedy for injuries resulting from operations of the
state and its subsidiaries.37 The difficulties it encountered in that at-
tempt suggest that the General Assembly would serve the people
well by exercising its own more flexible authority in this field.
B6 The majority opinion does quote with approval Muskopf v. Corning Hosp. Dist., 55
Cal.2d 211, 359 P.2d 457, 462 (1961) and therein the dissent in Dalehite v. United
States, 346 U.S. 15, 57 (1953) to the effect that the basic decisions of government
policy are not tortious.
ST The amendment to article I, section 16 of the Ohio constitution was adopted by a popu-
lar vote of 306,764 to 216,634. J. MERCER, OHIO LEGISLATIVE HISTORY 1909-1913, at 450
(19 ).
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